Manifesto for Peace | SPD politician: "Common security is a Herculean task"
The Peace Manifesto , initiated by prominent SPD leftists, has met with a huge response, but mostly with rejection . Did that surprise you?
I'm somewhat surprised by the overall response. In a way, I'm also pleased about it, because it shows that a spark has been ignited in the current political climate. We expected that the majority of reactions in the media would be critical. But the manner in which it was expressed, essentially defamatory, does strike me as odd. It clearly seems to be driven by the intention to view the manifesto only with a view to Ukraine and the question of how the war there can be ended. But we're actually concerned with fundamental questions of our security policy. We criticize the narrowing of the discussion to purely military issues and the plans for a gigantic rearmament, for which there is actually no reason on this scale given the military balance of power between NATO and Russia. But apparently, people simply don't want to discuss this.
Now, your first demands already relate to Ukraine: an end to the war as quickly as possible, and you point out that this cannot be achieved without making concessions to Russia. You still don't understand the accusations that you are thus becoming Moscow's mouthpiece?
This accusation always comes up. But of course, every effort must be made to reach a negotiated solution to end the killing and dying in Ukraine. However, in the manifesto, we did not attempt to outline exactly how this could be achieved. A separate document would actually have to be drafted for that, because the situation is so complex. In the manifesto, we call for something more fundamental: a return to a security policy based on the triad of adequate defense capability, arms control, and understanding – with the goal of resuming a system of common security. I have the impression that by focusing on the war in Ukraine, people are trying to distract from this core message.
They advocate a return to a common security order in Europe, as was already established with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Because this agreement is a reference point for the signatories of the manifesto, they are accused of being mentally stuck in the 1980s...
We ourselves know that the concepts of that time cannot be transferred one-to-one. But it is about a fundamental principle of policy, namely to consider the security needs of all parties involved. The question is whether we want to continue to define security policy solely in military terms, or whether we return to the state of knowledge we already had before the Helsinki Accords. This was that security cannot be achieved through military means alone, and that an uncontrolled arms race is self-endangering. And that, therefore, defense capability must be accompanied by arms control and understanding. This is precisely what we are formulating as our vision. It is clear that this is a Herculean task that cannot be accomplished overnight.
They have also been accused of anti-Americanism because of their critical statements about US policy towards China…
We simply state that the overarching conflict is the one building up between the US and China. The US's goal of containing China's further development by all means at its disposal is no secret; it's an official government policy in Washington. What's supposed to be anti-American about this statement?
German politicians also say that the greatest threat to the world today is China.
With China, for the first time, a country is emerging that could deprive the United States of its superpower and leadership role in the world. This conflict could indeed be very dangerous for our planet if it is primarily fought militarily. The danger that a third and thus probably final world war will be started around Taiwan is real. We will not be able to eliminate the rivalry between the great powers. But it will be crucial that this competition is fought economically and not with weapons.
In the manifesto, you also point out that new forms of colonialism threaten peace. What are you referring to specifically, and what should be done?
We are currently experiencing a battle for access to resources, which is expressed, among other things, in the US's efforts to annex Greenland. Ultimately, this is about access to the raw materials there, including rare earth elements. And in Ukraine, too, the US has secured priority access to raw materials through its deal with Kyiv – even over the Europeans, who had hoped for this. China has a far-reaching and problematic dominance in this matter. But our role cannot consist of using military force in the background to move towards sources of raw materials. We must find cooperative paths through the EU, but also an independent path vis-à-vis the US.
What chances do you think there are of achieving a change of direction within the party at the SPD party conference next week?
For years, we haven't even discussed security policy in its entirety. The topic of Ukraine and achieving "military readiness" has been at the forefront since the beginning of 2022. We want to initiate a broader discussion again. If we succeed in doing this without slipping back into this defamatory tone, a key goal will have been achieved. However, a shake-up of the line advocated by the party leadership and government members is neither planned nor foreseeable.
The Left Party proposes launching joint initiatives in the Bundestag to pursue the manifesto's goals, such as opposing the deployment of US medium-range missiles. What do you think about this?
From the manifesto movement, we primarily focus on the discourse within the SPD. That's why I don't think that's an option at the moment. It wouldn't be conducive to the internal party debate—also because it would be used by pro-armament media to defame us again. But beyond this moment, as we saw with the peace movement in the 1980s, very different forces can and must come together to at least share a common goal. We'll see if something like that can happen again around medium-range missiles.
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